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Governments across the developedworld have, over recent decades,
legislated for increases in the early and normal claiming ages that apply
to public pension schemes. Such policies have often been adopted with
the explicit intention of strengthening the public ﬁnances in the face of
rapidly aging populations – not only by reducing payments to pen-
sioners but also by increasing average retirement ages and thus gener-
ating additional tax revenues. In this paper we exploit a recent reform
of the early retirement age (ERA) for women in the UK to estimate the
effect on their labor force participation. This provides an important ad-
dition to the small existing empirical literature on this topic by examin-
ing such a reform in the context of a public pension system that provides
minimal ﬁnancial incentives to exit work at the ERA.
In 1995, the UK government legislated to increase the ERA (known
in the UK as the state pension age) for women from 60 to 65 between
2010 and 2020.1 This paper uses evidence on labor market behavior in
the UK between 2010 and 2014 to examine what impact increasing
the ERA from 60 to 62 has had on the economic activity of the affected
cohorts of women.
Gruber and Wise (2004) surveyed evidence on eleven developed
countries and highlighted the fact that labor force exits are concentrated
around legislated early and normal retirement ages and tend to be larg-
er than can be explained by the pureﬁnancial incentives associatedwith
retiring at these ages. Most of the early papers that attempted tount Street, London WC1E 7A
g.uk (C. Emmerson), gemm
s, there is no separate norma
elow, there is no requiremen
an open access article undersimulate the impact of moving these early and normal retirement ages
on labor force participation relied on using out-of-sample predictions.
Papers simulating changes in early and normal retirement ages in the
US suggested quite large effects on retirement ages (Fields and
Mitchell, 1984; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1985; Rust and Phelan,
1997; Coile and Gruber, 2000; French, 2005). For the UK, Blundell and
Emmerson (2007) estimate that a three-year increase in the ERA for
both men and women (and assuming that deﬁned beneﬁt occupational
pension schemes respond with a three-year increase in their normal
pension ages as well) would increase retirement ages by between 0.4
and 1.8 years, depending on the speciﬁcation used.
However, while the effects estimated in these ex ante simulations
were quite large, if anything the results of ex post evaluations suggests
even larger effects. One of the ﬁrst papers to examine ex post the impact
of a change in ERAs was Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999), who
looked at evidence from the reduction in the earliest age of pension re-
ceipt in Germany from 65 to 63 in 1972. Prior to this reform, the vast
majority of men in Germany retired at age 65, whereas after the reform
there was a signiﬁcant shift towards retiring at age 63. More recently,
there have been a growing number of reforms around the world,
which have increased pension ages. Therefore, ex post evaluations
have become more common in the literature, although almost all of
these have focused on changes to normal, rather than early, retirement
ages (including, among others: Mastrobuoni, 2009; Hanel and Riphahn,
2012; Behagel and Blau, 2012; and Lalive and Staubli, 2014).E, UK
a_t@ifs.org.uk (G. Tetlow).
l retirement age. In keepingwith the rest of the literature, we refer to the state pension age
t in theUK for people to retire at thepoint they claim their pension, and they experience no
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3 Moreover, there is evidence that individuals change their behavior upon receiving cor-
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Atalay and Barrett (2015), who examine the effect of changes in ERAs.
The former use administrative data and employ a similar estimation
strategy to that used in this paper to examine an increase in the ERA
in Austria. They ﬁnd that a one year increase in the ERA led to an in-
crease in employment rates of 9.75 percentage points for affected men
and by 11 percentage points for affected women, with increases in un-
employment rates of a similar size. Manoli and Weber (2016) study
the same Austrian reforms andﬁnd large delays in job exits and pension
claiming caused by the increase in the ERA. However, the Austrian state
pension system is different from the UK (and a number of other coun-
tries' systems) in several important ways. First, in the Austrian system,
individuals' pension beneﬁts are completelywithdrawn if their earnings
exceed around $500 a month. Second, although the Austrian system
provides some increase in pension income for delayed drawing, this is
done at a less than actuarially fair rate. Third, the Austrian state pension
provides a very high level of earnings replacement (according to Staubli
and Zweimüller (2013), the average net replacement rate of pre-
retirement earnings is 75%); public pensions, therefore, provide the
main source of income for most pensioners in Austria.
Atalay and Barrett (2015) examine the effect of an increase in the
earliest age at which women can access the Australian Age Pension.
They ﬁnd, using cross-sectional survey data, that a one year increase
in the eligibility age induced a 12–19 percentage point increase in fe-
male labor supply. In Australia (unlike in the UK and many other coun-
tries) receipt of the state pension ismeans-tested against income,which
provides a strong incentive for many Australians to retire at the point at
which they can become eligible for the pension.2
Importantly, our paper adds to the evidence provided by Staubli and
Zweimüller (2013) and Atalay and Barrett (2015) by providing the ﬁrst
evidence from a change in ERA in the context of a system (the UK sys-
tem) in which there are not strong ﬁnancial disincentives to working
beyond the ERA, and where private pension saving provides a signiﬁ-
cant fraction of retirement income for many people. In these respects,
the UK pension system is more similar to that in the US than either
the Austrian or the Australian system.
Women's economic activity could be affected by an increase in the
ERA through four main mechanisms. First, increasing the ERA will
have some effect on individuals' marginal ﬁnancial incentives to work,
through changingmarginal tax rates and eligibility for out-of-work ben-
eﬁts. This channel will be signiﬁcantly less important in the UK than it is
in some other countries because there is no earnings test for state pen-
sion receipt in the UK.
Second, the increase in the ERA reduces the length of time that indi-
viduals receive state pension income for and thus reduces their lifetime
wealth; this will tend to increase labor supply. However, if those affect-
ed were forward looking and well informed, this response might have
manifested as soon as the legislation was passed. Since this policy re-
formwas announced 15 years in advance, wemight expect adjustments
in employment rates around the ERA to be quite small, as individuals
have had a considerable period of time over which to adjust their be-
havior. However, evidence suggests that – even many years after the
legislation was passed – many of the women affected were unaware
of it. Crawford and Tetlow (2010) – using data collected in 2006–07 –
ﬁnd that, at that time, six-in-ten of those women who face an ERA
somewhere between 60 and 65 were unaware of their true ERA. This
suggests that some women may face a signiﬁcant shock as they ap-
proach their ERA and thus may have to adjust their behavior sharply2 There have also been some studies of “early retirement” programs. Vestad (2013)
studies the reduction in the age that individuals can take early retirement in Norway
and ﬁnd that 2/3 of pensioners would have been in work at age 63 had the age for early
retirement been 64 rather than 62. However, this “early retirement” program was not
open to all workers (it excluded half of private sector workers), it involved very high re-
placement rates (70% of after-tax earnings) and the pension beneﬁts were earnings-
tested, meaning the institutional structure is, once again, very different to that seen in
the UK.over a short period of time. Previous evidence suggests that individuals
respond most strongly to what they believe the rules of the system are,
even if their beliefs are incorrect (Bottazzi et al., 2006; Coppola and
Wilke, 2014).3
Third, individuals who are credit constrained may have to continue
working during the period when they are no longer able to receive
their state pension in order to ﬁnance their consumption.
Fourth, the ERA may provide a signal about the ‘appropriate’ age at
which to retire. The UK Department for Work and Pensions writes to
each person who is entitled to a state pension four months before
they become eligible to tell them how to claim. Therefore, even if the
person is entirely unaware of their eligibility date before this, this com-
munication may provide a strong signal. If the ERA does provide such
signals, moving this age could have a greater impact on employment
rates than the pure ﬁnancial incentives would suggest.
There is mixed evidence from previous work about the importance
of such signals around retirement ages. Lumsdaine et al. (1996) found
that there are excess peaks in retirement in the United States at age
65 (the Social Security normal retirement age at the time), over and
above those explained by the ﬁnancial incentives generated by Social
Security and Medicare, implying that there is an important signal to re-
tire at 65. Kopczuk and Song (2008) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant pattern of individ-
uals claiming Social Security in January or on their birthday, either of
which might be considered a simple focal point or signal. Behagel and
Blau (2012) conclude that non-standard preferences can explain why
older Americans responded so strongly to the increase in the normal re-
tirement age in Social Security that occurred in the early 2000s. Converse-
ly, others have found evidence to the contrary – for example, Asch et al.
(2005), who examined the retirement behavior of civil service employees
in the US, who face different ﬁnancial incentives to retire from the
majority of the population who are covered by Social Security.
We identify the impact of increasing the ERA by comparing cohorts
who face different ERAs, while allowing for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of co-
hort, age and time effects. However, the speciﬁcation we have chosen
limits us to identifying only those effects that manifest between the old
and new ERAs; other differences in employment rates between treated
and control cohorts that occur before or after these points will be
subsumed into the cohort effects that are included in our speciﬁcation.4
We ﬁnd that employment rates of women at ages 60 and 61 in-
creased by 6.3 percentage points when the ERA was increased from 60
to 62; this result is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This is equiv-
alent to about a two month increase in the average retirement age
and implies that around three-quarters of excess retirements that
used to occur at age 60 are explained by that being the ERA. The result
is robust to a number of speciﬁcation tests, including using a linear
probability model rather than probit, and variations in the sample cho-
sen to exclude repeat observations on the same individuals, and
allowing for serial correlation in employment shocks.
Subgroup analysis provides some evidence on which mechanisms
may be important in explaining the changes in behavior that we ob-
serve. There is no signiﬁcant difference in the response among owner-
occupiers and renters, which we interpret as suggestive evidence that
credit constraints may not be the primary driver. In addition, the cohort
ﬁxed effects included in our model control for differences in state pen-
sion wealth across cohorts that are a direct result of the increase inrect information about state pension rules. Liebman and Luttmer (2015) run an experi-
ment providing individuals with information on life expectancy and Social Security rules
in the US and ﬁnd labor force participation is 4 percentage points higher than the control
group one year later.
4 The working paper version of this paper explores employment responses prior to the
ERA using a method similar to that employed by Mastrobuoni (2009): that is, essentially
specifying a functional form for the cohort effects and attributing any deviations from this
pattern between cohorts who were affected by the 1995 legislation and those who were
not as being the result of the policy change. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence of women
having responded at earlier ages (Cribb et al., 2013).
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evidence that wealth effects are the driver of the response we see. In
contrast to increases in the ERA that have been legislated in other coun-
tries (notably Austria and Australia), the absence of any earnings test,
means that there are not strong ﬁnancial incentives to retire at the
ERA. Together these suggest that the role of the ERA in providing a signal
about the appropriate retirement age may well be an important reason
why increasing the ERA feeds through into such a sizeable increase in
labor force participation.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes
the institutional setting, the policy reforms we exploit and the data we
use, and presents evidence on how employment rates changed around
the ERA prior to the reform. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy
and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Institutional background and data
2.1. Institutional details: state pensions
Between 1948 and April 2010, the ERA for women in the UK (that is,
the earliest age at which they can receive a state pension) was age 60.
There is no earnings test for receipt of the state pension (that is, the
amount received is not reduced if the individual also has earned
income)5 but individuals do receive an actuarial adjustment of beneﬁts
if they delay claiming beyond the ERA.6 Those not claiming the state
pension when they reach the ERA receive a 1% increase for each ﬁve
weeks of deferral, which is equivalent to a 10.4% increase for each
year that they delay claiming. However, in practice (and somewhat sur-
prisingly given the generosity of the deferral rate), very few people
choose to delay. Evidence from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(Crawford and Tetlow 2010) suggests that only 5% of those aged be-
tween the ERA and 75 in 2008–09 had deferred receipt of their state
pension.
Given that 95% of people in the UK claim their state pension at the
ERA, and a large fraction of people work beyond their ERA,7 it is not ap-
propriate to deﬁne “retirement” as claiming a state pension, as is done
in some countries. Instead, research into retirement behavior that uses
UK data characterizes retirement as an exit from the labormarket, rath-
er than claiming a pension. For examples of this, see Meghir and
Whitehouse 1997; Blundell and Johnson 1998 and Blundell et al., 2004.
The UK state pension consists of two parts. The ﬁrst-tier pension
(known as the basic state pension) is based on the number of years
(but not on the level) of contributions made.8 The second-tier pension
is positively related to earnings across the whole of working life (from
1978 onwards); enhancements are also awarded for periods spent out
of work due to some formal caring responsibilities since April 2002.
However, historically, themajority of employees has opted out of build-
ing entitlement to this second-tier pension and instead build up a pri-
vate pension entitlement in return for a reduction in payroll taxes.95 The earnings test was abolished in 1989. Disney and Smith (2002) examine the labor
supply impact of this change.
6 Since October 2006 it has been illegal for employers to force individuals aged under 65
to retire on the grounds of age alone. Between October 2006 and March 2011, employers
were able to impose compulsory retirement ages at or above age 65, but sinceApril 2011 it
has been illegal to impose any compulsory retirement age, unless it can be objectively jus-
tiﬁedby thedemands of the job. It is also veryunlikely that employers are using temporary
contracts to allow older workers to be dismissed at the ERA, as these are very rare in the
UK. Only 2.7% of 60 year old women were employed on a “non-permanent contract” in
2009–10.
7 According to the UK Labour Force Survey 44% of 60 year old women, and 30% of 65
year old men – the ERA for men is 65 – were in work in the 2 years prior to the increase
in the ERA for women.
8 Periods in receipt of certain unemployment and disability beneﬁts and periods spent
caring for children or adults can also boost entitlement.
9 Crawford et al. (2013) estimate that 82% of men and women born between 1951 and
1954 had opted out of building entitlement to the second tier pension at some point dur-
ing their working lives. A full description of the UK state pension system can be found in
Bozio et al. (2010).A full basic state pension in 2012–13 was worth £107.45 a week
(equivalent to around $170 or 17% of average full-time weekly
earnings).10 Most men and women now reaching the ERA can qualify
for the full award. The second-tier pension scheme replaces 20% of earn-
ings within a certain band. The maximum total weekly beneﬁt that
could be received in 2012–13 was around $260. However, since most
employees opted out of the second-tier pension scheme in the past,
the majority of pensioners receive far less than this from the state.
The Pensions Act 1995 legislated for the ERA forwomen to rise grad-
ually from 60 to 65 over the ten years fromApril 2010, with the ERA ris-
ing by one month every two months for ten years, equalizing with that
for men (at age 65) by April 2020. As a result, women born after April
1950 have an ERA of greater than 60.11 This is shown in Fig. 1, which
also shows the effect of a more recent reform to future ERAs that we
do not examine here. The total loss from a one-year increase in the
ERA is around $9000 for a woman who qualiﬁes for a full basic state
pension and no additional pension, rising to about $22,400 for a
woman who qualiﬁes for a full basic state pension and a full additional
pension entitlement.
State pension entitlements make up a signiﬁcant fraction of total re-
tirement resources for some individuals, while for many others they are
much less important. Table 1 shows statistics on the distribution of dif-
ferent types ofwealth among the cohorts of women that are the focus of
this paper. On average, these cohorts had accrued just under $210,000
of state pension entitlements by 2010; this ﬁgure is calculated as the
present discounted value of the estimated future stream of state pen-
sion income. However, these women's mean total family wealth is just
over $1.3 million. On average, women's own state pension wealth
accounted for one-quarter of their family's total wealth; but for one-
in-nine women their state pension wealth accounts for more than half
their family's total wealth. Since the ERA rises gradually as shown in
Fig. 1, on average, women born in 1950–51 and 1951–52 experience a
one year loss of state pension income. A loss of one year of full basic
state pension corresponds to a 4% of women's median state pension
wealth, and 0.8% of median net family wealth.
2.2. Institutional details: tax and beneﬁt system
In the UK, some features of the direct tax and beneﬁt also change
when an individual reaches the ERAandpotentially inﬂuence incentives
to remain in paidwork. First, employees are no longer liable for employ-
ee National Insurance contributions (i.e. payroll taxes decline); this in-
creases the ﬁnancial incentive to be in paid employment. Second,
instead of being able to claim the unemployment and disability beneﬁts
for working-age adults who are out of work,12 households with one
member above the female ERA become eligible to claim the means-
tested pension credit guarantee. This is more generous than the equiv-
alent working-age beneﬁts: not only is the amount received higher (it
is worth £142.70 per week, or around $230, with greater amounts for
thosewith disabilities) but there are also no requirements for recipients
to, for example, seek work or attend work-focused interviews. This re-
duces the incentive for individuals to be in, or to seek, paid work after10 Women approaching the early retirement age earn, on average, much less than the
economy-wide average and aremore likely towork part time.Median earnings for 59 year
oldwomenwhowere inwork in the two years prior to the increase in the early retirement
agewere about $410 perweek,meaning that a full basic state pension isworth around40%
of actual median earnings for this group.
11 To our knowledge no occupational pension schemes adjusted their normal pension
ages in line with the change in the early retirement age for women. Until recently, the
most common normal pension ages were 60 in public sector schemes and 65 in private
sector schemes. We are not aware of any schemes that apply a different normal pension
age to male and female scheme members.
12 The main working-age unemployment beneﬁt is known as Jobseeker's Allowance
(JSA) and is paid at a rate of £71.00 ($115) per week. The main working-age disability-
related beneﬁt is known as Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) and is paid at a rate
of £99.15 ($160) per week.
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Fig. 1. UK early retirement age for women under different legislation. Notes: the reason
that the ERA increases in a “sawtooth” pattern, rather than a smooth line or a “step”
pattern, is that women born in a given month are allocated a single “state pension date”
at which they are eligible for a state pension. Therefore, women born later in the month
have a slightly lower ERA than those born earlier in the month. Source: Pensions Act
1995, schedule 4 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/26/schedule/4/enacted);
Pensions Act 2007, schedule 3 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/22/schedule/
3); Pensions Act 2011, schedule 1 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/19/
schedule/1/enacted).
Table 1
Distribution of wealth for women born between April 1949 and March 1952.
$ thousands Mean
25th
percentile Median
75th
percentile
State pension wealth (individual) 206.7 159.6 212.3 259.3
State pension wealth (family) 365.7 273.2 381.1 475.4
Private pension wealth (individual) 145.8 0.0 37.7 169.4
Private pension wealth (family) 401.0 34.9 220.1 531.1
Net ﬁnancial wealth (family) 136.2 2.3 39.1 146.4
Net housing wealth (family) 325.9 137.3 290.8 452.3
Other physical wealth (family) 90.7 0.0 0.0 7.3
Total net wealth (family) 1,325.5 645.6 1,067.1 1,657.9
Notes: Sample includes all ELSA core sample members born between 1 April 1949 and 31
March 1952. Sample size=746.
Source: English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, wave 5 (2010–11). Weighted using cross-
sectional weights.
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Fig. 2. Economic activity of women prior to early retirement age reform, by age. Note:
Averages over the period 2003Q1–2010Q1. Source: Authors' calculations using the LFS.
Based on 404,428 observations.
206 J. Cribb et al. / Labour Economics 42 (2016) 203–212reaching the ERA.13 These different effects mean that somewomen face
a reduced incentive towork (as measured by a participation tax rate) at
the age of 60 when the ERA rises, while others see almost no change or
an increased incentive to work.
2.3. Data
We use data from the UK's Labour Force Survey (LFS).14 This is con-
ducted on a quarterly basis, with all individuals in a household followed13 However, eligibility for pension credit is determined at the family level: a family is el-
igible for pension credit if eitherpartner is over the early retirement age forwomen. There-
fore, the higher generosity of pension credit relative to working-age out-of-work beneﬁts
only gives an incentive to retire at the early retirement age for single women or women
with a partner younger than them (47% of our sample). Moreover, many families are only
eligible for lower levels of pension credit (or none at all) due to other sources of income
(e.g. state or private pensions) or owning (non-housing) assets above £10,000. For more
details on the UK beneﬁt system, see Hood and Oakley (2014).
14 We do not use data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing, which was de-
scribed in Table 2.1, as it does not yet provide sufﬁcient observations of employment rates
of older women since the early retirement age started to increase. The sample size of
women in the relevant cohorts is also much larger in the LFS than in ELSA.for up to ﬁve consecutive quarters (‘waves’) and with one-ﬁfth of
households being replaced in each wave. For survey data, the sample
size is large and the survey contains information on individual labor
market activities combined with background information such as sex,
age, marital status, education and housing tenure. Crucially for our
study, the data contain month as well as year of birth, and relatively
large numbers of individuals are observed from each birth cohort at
each age. For example, about 170 individuals born in the ﬁrst quarter
to be affected by the reform (1950Q2) are observed in each quarter of
the LFS data that we use in our analysis (which runs from 2009Q2 to
2014Q2). Further details of the achieved sample size by age and cohort
are shown in Table A1 in the appendix.
Since the LFS data are used to produce internationally comparable
employment and unemployment statistics, we use the International La-
bour Organization (ILO) deﬁnitions of economic activity. Under these
deﬁnitions, an individual is categorized as employed if they do any
paidwork (as an employee or self-employed) in theweek of their inter-
view, if they are temporarily away from paid work or if they are on a
government training scheme (although this last category is rare for
older people). Individuals are considered as being in full-time work if
they work 30 or more hours in a usual week. If individuals are not in
work, they are categorized as either unemployed (looking for work in
the last four weeks or waiting for a job to start and they must be able
to start work within the next two weeks), or “economically inactive”.
Of those who are economically inactive, they can give a number of rea-
sons why they are not in (or actively seeking) paid work. These reasons
are being ‘retired’, sick or ‘disabled’, or a residual category that includes
looking after the family (these are all self-deﬁned).
The pattern of economic activity of older women by age is shown in
Fig. 2. This uses LFS data pooled across the eight years before the female
ERA was increased. The percentage of women in paid work (either full-
time or part-time) declines with age. Between age 59 and age 60, there
is a 13.7 percentage point drop in employment and a 23.5 percentage
point increase in the percentage reporting themselves as retired. Both
of these changes are bigger than any of the changes observed between
other consecutive ages. However, prior to the ERA for women being in-
creased, it was not possible to separate out the extent to which this was
an impact of hitting the ERA as opposed to an impact of reaching age
60.15 The 13.7 percentage point decrease in employment at age 6015 One approach has been to assume a parametric relationship between labormarket ex-
it and age (for example, a quadratic in age) and also allow for an additional impact of hit-
ting the early retirement age. But this assumes that all of the additional retirements that
occur at age 60, over and above those explained by the relationship with age measured
at earlier and later ages (and other covariates in the model), are due to this age being
the early retirement age. See, for example, Blundell and Emmerson (2007).
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Fig. 3. Employment rates of women over time, by single year of age. Note: The solid
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year olds were under the ERA. Source: Authors' calculations using the LFS, 2003–2014.
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207J. Cribb et al. / Labour Economics 42 (2016) 203–212compares to a fall of 3.8 percentage points between ages 58 and 59 and
of 6.3 percentage points between ages 60 and 61. A simple comparison
of these differences would imply there is an excess spike of women
leaving employment at age 60 of between 7 and 10 percent of the
population.
An initial indication of what the impact of increasing the ERA on em-
ployment has been is provided by Fig. 3. This shows how employment
rates of older women have evolved since 2003 by single year of age.
While employment rates at each age have generally been increasing
over time (due, at least in part, tomore recent cohorts of women having
greater labor force attachment), a particularly large increase has been
observed for 60-year-old women from April 2010, which is when the
ERA started to rise. In 2010Q1 (just prior to the increase in ERA for
women), the employment rate of 60-year-old women was 41.5%; by
2012Q2 (the ﬁrst quarter in which all 60-year-olds were under the
ERA), it had increased to 51.4%. This 9.8 percentage point increase is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. During the same two-year period,
the employment rate of 61-year-olds fell slightly (by 0.3 percentage
points, from 38.4% to 38.1%, a change that is not statistically signiﬁcant).
As the ERA rose from age 61 to 62, the employment rate of 61 year
old women increased rapidly, by 10.9 percentage points from 37.7% in
2012Q2 (when 61 year olds were over the ERA) to 48.6% in 2014Q2
(when all 61 year olds were under the ERA), while the employment
rates of other age groups increased over this period too, it did so by
less. The increases in employment rates of 60 year olds from 2010 toTable 2
Economic activity for women born between April 1949 and March 1954, in the period 2009Q2
Sample
Percentage of sample in each economic activity
Full-time work Part- time work Unemployed
Full sample 26.4 24.1 1.9
Single women 31.6 19.0 3.0
Women with a partner 24.3 26.2 1.4
– whose partner is older 23.4 25.4 1.3
– whose partner is younger 26.8 28.6 1.6
Rent house 20.4 14.9 3.4
Own house 27.9 26.3 1.5
Degree or other HE 31.8 25.5 1.7
Secondary education 28.5 26.3 2.0
No qualiﬁcations 14.8 17.4 1.9
Notes: Totals may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Source: Authors' calculations using the LFS.2012 and of 61 year olds from 2012 to 2014 were the largest increases
over any two year period shown in Fig. 3 and provide indicative evi-
dence of a substantial effect on labor supply of older women from in-
creasing their ERA.
Sections III and IV present formal approaches to estimating this ef-
fect, controlling in a more sophisticated manner for time effects, cohort
effects and differences in observed characteristics between the different
cohorts of women.
A description of the background characteristics and the variation in
economic statuses by these characteristics, of women close to the ERA
immediately before and after it started to rise from age 60 is shown in
Table 2. Among those not in paid work, the most common reported ac-
tivities are being ‘retired’, being ‘sick or disabled’ and ‘other’ (which
most commonly refers to looking after the home or family). Relatively
few women in this group report themselves as being unemployed.
Full-time employment is more common among single women than
among those in couples. Those who own their own home are much
more likely to be in work (either full- or part-time) than those who
rent their home, while those in the latter group are relatively more like-
ly to be unemployed or sick/disabled (indeed, almost one-third of
renters report being sick or disabled). Employment rates are positively
correlated with levels of education, with those with lower levels of ed-
ucation being more likely to report being sick/disabled or having
‘other’ as their main economic activity.
3. Empirical methodology
Using data on the labor market behavior of women who face differ-
ent ERAs allows us to estimate what impact increasing the ERA for
women from 60 to 62 has had on labor force participation. To do this,
we employ a difference-in-differences methodology. The ‘treatment’
(T, being under the ERA) is administered to all women but, since the re-
form was introduced, is administered for longer to women born more
recently. Eq. (1) below sets out the difference-in-differences speciﬁca-
tion we use to estimate the impact of increasing the ERA.
yict ¼ αTict þ γt þ λc þ∑
A
a¼1
δa½ageict ¼ a þ Xictβ þ εict ð1Þ
Our aim is to estimate the effect on an outcome, y, for individual, i, of
being below (rather than above) the ERA. Age and calendar time are im-
portant determinants of labor force participation, so we control for
these variables ﬂexibly: ﬁxed effects are used to control for age (in
years and quarters, with 33 dummies included in the model), and
time period (γt- in year and quarter, with 20 dummies). Since each co-
hort of women in the UK has higher labor market attachment, we also
we want control for ﬁxed differences between cohorts. By including–2014Q2.
Sample size
Inactive: Sick or disabled Inactive: Retired Inactive: Other
11.6 27.6 8.4 60,173
18.3 22.4 5.7 17,712
8.9 29.8 9.5 42,461
8.8 31.4 9.8 31,315
9.0 25.4 8.7 8,901
29.7 20.9 10.6 11,572
7.3 29.2 7.8 48,601
5.3 30.0 5.9 17,514
9.9 25.8 7.7 29,404
24.0 28.8 13.2 13,255
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hort effects in a ﬂexible way too.16
Using this speciﬁcation, we implicitly assume that there are cohort-
and time-constant age effects, time- and age-constant cohort effects and
age- and cohort-constant time effects. The last is the usual common
trends assumption required for identiﬁcation in difference-in-
differences estimation.
The age- and time-constant cohort effects control in a ﬂexible way
for underlying differences in employment patterns between different
cohorts of women. However, this comes at the cost of subsumingwithin
this ‘cohort effect’ any impact of the ERA reform that manifests itself in
time-constant changes in economic activity rates among the affected
cohorts before age 60.17 These cohort effects will also control for differ-
ences across cohorts in state pensionwealth,meaning that the effectwe
ﬁnd of the reform on labor force participation will not be due to wealth
effects, unless these manifest in a non-linear way across cohorts that is
not accounted for in our speciﬁcation. The next section contains some
sensitivity analysis regarding how we allow for cohort effects.
We also control for a vector of individual characteristics, X. These in-
clude education, relationship status, housing tenure, ethnicity, and ge-
ography, as well as partner's age and partner's education for those
with a partner – the full set of covariates included is laid out in
Table A2 in the appendix.
The primary outcome of interest is the effect of increasing the ERA
on employment. This is estimated using both ordinary least squares
(OLS) and a probit model, calculating the average marginal effects of
the treatment.18 However, we are also interested in the other possible
economic states. To assess these, we use multinomial probit models to
examine the impact of increasing the ERA on: ﬁrst, whether an individ-
ual is in full-time or part-time work or not in paid work; and, second,
whether an individual is in work, or is unemployed or whether they
self-report as being retired, sick or disabled, or a residual category.
Since the LFS tracks individuals over up to ﬁve consecutive quarters
of data, our sample containsmultiple observations on the same individ-
uals and so the observations are not independent of one another. We
allow for this by clustering standard errors at the individual level and
also conduct a sensitivity analysis using only the ﬁrst observation on
each individual; we show that this changes the estimated marginal ef-
fect very little but increases the standard errors as the sample size is
substantially reduced. Our results are also robust to allowing for serially
correlated cohort shocks.4. Results
4.1. Effect of increasing the ERA on women's employment rates
All themodels are estimated on data from 2009Q2 – one year before
the ERA started to rise– to 2014Q2– theﬁrst point atwhich the ERAhad
reached 62. The cohorts included are those born in 1949-50 to 1953-54,
which includes one cohort unaffected by the reform (1949–50) and four16 We could not control for cohort using ﬁxed effects for year and quarter of birth, as that
would be perfectly co-linear with the age and time ﬁxed effects. Using (ﬁnancial) year of
birth dummies allows us to control ﬂexibly for ﬁxed differences in labour market partici-
pation for different cohorts, without encountering problems of perfect co-linearity.
17 Any other policy changes that affect cohorts (and their behavior) differently, but in a
time-constantway,will also be absorbed into these cohort effects. This could apply, for ex-
ample, to the reforms legislated in Pensions Act 2007, which changed the way that pen-
sion entitlements were calculated (in a way that made the system more generous on
average) for all those born after 5 April 1950.
18 Since being under the early retirement age is a function of both a woman's cohort and
time, the treatment variable, T, is an interaction term. In a non-linear model, calculating
marginal effects on an interaction term does not produce a difference-in-differences treat-
ment effect as it does in a linear model. To estimate the treatment effect in a non-linear
model, we estimate the model and then, for each observation, look at the difference in
the predicted probability of employment if above and below the early retirement age
and then average across all observations to calculate the average marginal effect across
the whole distribution of other regressors.cohortswhose ERAwas changed by the reform.Of course, aswas shown
in Fig. 1, younger cohorts are also affected by the reform, but they are
not observed in our data past the old ERA of 60, so they are not included
in this analysis. Cohort is controlled for using ﬁnancial year of birth (e.g.
1950–51 includes those born between 1 April 1950 and 31March 1951)
ﬁxed effects. Time is controlled for using year and quarter ﬁxed effects
and there are age ﬁxed effects in years and quarters to control ﬁnely
for age, which is particularly important in ensuring that the estimate
of being under the ERA is not simply capturing the effect of being youn-
ger. Calculating whether each individual woman is above or below the
ERA involves calculating the date at which she becomes eligible for a
state pension, and then comparing it to the date of interview.19
Table 3 reports the results from estimating Eq. (1) using a variety of
econometric speciﬁcations where the dependent variable is being in
employment. Our preferred speciﬁcation is speciﬁcation 6, which is a
probit model with standard errors clustered at the individual level.
This shows that being under the ERA increases the probability of being
inwork by 6.3 percentage points, with this impact being statistically dif-
ferent from zero at the 1% level.20
This effectmay seem small compared to the effects of raising the ERA
found in by Atalay and Barrett (2015) in Australia (12–19 percentage
points) and Staubli and Zweimuller (2013) in Austria (9.75–11 percent-
age points). However, while there are large changes in the incentives to
be in work around the ERA in Austria and Australia there are only min-
imal changes in ﬁnancial incentives to work at this point in the UK, due
to the absence of the earnings test. In that context, we ﬁnd a sizeable
labor supply response to only a very limited change in the incentive to
be in work. Indeed, the magnitude of this estimated effect implies that
around three-quarters of the “excess” retirements previously observed
at age 60 in the UK (as shown in Fig. 2) can be explained by it having
been the ERA.
To test whether the inclusion of multiple waves of data has an im-
pact on our results and whether our clustering is appropriate, we com-
pare speciﬁcations estimated by OLS. Speciﬁcation 2 is the OLS
counterpart to speciﬁcation 6; this shows a 6.5 percentage point effect
of being under the ERA. Using only one wave of data (speciﬁcation
3) to test the importance of including non-independent observations
on the same individuals, the estimated impact is almost unchanged ,
at 6.6 percentage points, from when using all waves, but we estimate
the impactwith less precision owing to the considerably smaller sample
size (although the estimated impact is still statistically signiﬁcant at the
1% level). Our preferred approach is, therefore, to include all waves of
data, but cluster at the individual level.
A further worry may be that there are shocks at the cohort–time
level. If the correlation in employment shocks between people from
the same cohort at the same time is positive, this would tend to bias
standard errors downwards: in other words, we would be too likely to
conclude that raising the ERA affected employment even if it did not
(see, for example, Moulton (1990) Donald and Lang (2007)). We may
also worry that there is serial correlation in employment shocks, at19 Under the reform, people born from the sixth day of onemonth to the ﬁfth day of the
next month become eligible for a state pension on the same date. While the exact day of
interview is observed in the LFS, only an individual's year andmonth of birth are available,
not their day of birth. This means that those women born between the ﬁrst and ﬁfth days
of any month are allocated a date of becoming eligible to a state pension that is 2 months
after they actually reach their early retirement age. If dates of birth are distributed uni-
formlywithin eachmonth,wewill havemisclassiﬁedwhether thewoman is over or under
her early retirement age for 2.7% of women. Similarly, age in years and quarters may be
mismeasured for a small number of individuals, by at most one quarter.
20 While ethnicity and education (in practice) are ﬁxed for older women, the increase in
the early retirement age could affect relationship status or housing tenure, so these char-
acteristics could be endogenous. Running themodel (speciﬁcation 6) without controls for
relationship status, partner's characteristics or housing tenure leads to a coefﬁcient esti-
mate of 0.062, very similar to the estimate including them. As it is unlikely that the in-
crease in the early retirement age has had any important effects on housing tenure or
relationship status, we include these as explanatory variables in our preferred
speciﬁcation.
Table 4
Effect of increasing the early retirement age from 60 to 62 on women's employment for
different subgroups.
Effect of
being
under ERA
Std
error N
Average employment
rate at
ages 60 & 61 pre-reform
Full sample 0.063*** [0.014] 60,173 40.9%
Single women 0.097*** [0.025] 17,712 40.2%
Women with a partner 0.052*** [0.017] 42,461 41.2%
– whose partner is older 0.051** [0.020] 31,315 37.4%
– whose partner is
younger
0.061* [0.034] 11,146 49.2%
Rent house 0.051* [0.029] 11,572 30.5%
Own house 0.071*** [0.016] 48,601 43.1%
Notes:
All models are estimated using OLS estimated on women born in 1949–50 to 1953–54
from 2009Q2 to 2014Q2 with standard errors clustered at the individual level. Pre-reform
employment rate estimated from LFS data in 2008–09 and 2009–10.
* Denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level.
** Denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** Denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level.
Table 3
Effect of increasing the early retirement age from 60 to 62 on women's employment.
Speciﬁcation Number of waves Estimated by Standard errors clustering Effect of being under ERA Standard error N
(1) 5 OLS Not clustered 0.065*** [0.009] 60,173
(2) 5 OLS At individual level 0.065*** [0.014] 60,173
(3) 1 OLS Not clustered 0.066*** [0.020] 13,588
(4) 1 OLS At cohort level 0.066*** [0.020] 13,588
(5) 1 OLS Wild cluster bootstrap-t 0.066*** [N/A]a 13,588
(6) 5 Probit At individual level 0.063*** [0.014] 60,173
(7 - pseudo reform) 5 Probit At individual level –0.007 [0.017] 37,804
Notes: *** denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Speciﬁcations 1–6 estimated onwomen born in 1949-50 to 1953-54
from 2009Q2 to 2014Q2. Speciﬁcation 7 (‘pseudo reform’) estimated onwomen born in 1947-48 to 1950-51 from 2007Q2 to 2010Q2. Probit models estimated usingmaximum likelihood
estimation, and standard errors calculated by bootstrapping the marginal effect 1000 times. Cohort-level clusters are at year and month of birth level.
a Using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure calculates a correct p-value with small numbers of clusters, not standard errors. The estimated p-value using this procedure was 0.006.
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been shown seriously to bias standard errors (Bertrand et al., 2004;
Cameron et al., 2008). To test the implications of these concerns, we
ﬁrst, in speciﬁcation 4, account for clustering at the cohort (deﬁned
here as month and year of birth) level using cluster-robust standard er-
rors (Liang and Zeger, 1986). Thismakes little difference to the standard
error. However, these standard errors are only consistent as the number
of clusters tends to inﬁnity, and we have only 60 clusters. Therefore, in
speciﬁcation 5, we implement a wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure, as
suggested by Cameron et al. (2008), to account both for any cohort–
time-level shocks and serial correlation in individual and/or cohort–
time shocks,21 and we ﬁnd the effect is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Therefore, serially correlated cohort–time shocks do not seem to pres-
ent a problem in estimating standard errors in this case.
A further test of the validity of ourmodel is to conduct a placebo test
– that is, to test whether there is an effect whenwewould not expect to
see one. Oneway to do this is to imagine that the reformwas introduced
in 2008 instead of 2010 and look for the impact of being below, rather
than above, this pseudo ERA for these earlier cohorts. We would expect
to see no effect of this pseudo ERA and speciﬁcation 7 shows that there
is, indeed, no impact. The size of the marginal effect is small and of the
opposite sign to that found for ourmain speciﬁcations, and is not statis-
tically different from zero.
Finally (not presented in the table) we test the sensitivity of our
main result (from speciﬁcation 6) to different ways for controlling for
cohort effects. Not including any control for birth cohort led to the esti-
mated effect of being under the ERA on employment increasing slightly
to 0.069 (insteadof 0.063). A richer speciﬁcation – inwhichwe allow for
ﬁnancial year of birth cohort effects to differ by year of age (thus
exploiting the fact that even within these cells there is variation in the
ERA) – is found to lead to a very similar estimated effect of being aged
under the ERA on employment of 0.064 (with a larger standard error
of 0.018 percentage points, but still sufﬁciently small for the estimate
to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
Although our preferred speciﬁcation is the probit model (speciﬁca-
tion 6), the small difference between the estimated impact using OLS
and a probit model implies that we can use linear probability models
to test whether the effect is the same across all subgroups, which we
do to examine whether any particular groups respond more strongly
to reaching the ERA. Table 4 presents marginal effects of being under
the ERA, estimated separately for different subgroups using OLS. Al-
though there is substantial variation in the point estimates, there are
no signiﬁcant differences in the estimates between subgroups. Single
women, if anything, respond more strongly than those in couples. This
might be expected given that the latter potentially have an additional
margin (their partner's labor supply) on which they can adjust to the
loss of state pension.21 Cameron et al. (2008) show that a wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure can be used to
obtain hypothesis tests of the right size even with few clusters.Womenwho own their own home have a very similar estimated ef-
fect (economically and statistically) to those who rent their home.
Home owners are less likely to be credit constrained because they are
more likely to have savings or access to credit than renters. This suggests
that credit constraints may not play a signiﬁcant role in determining
how women respond to increasing the ERA.4.2. Effect of increasing the ERA on broader measures of women's economic
activity
The effect of increasing the ERA on employment is important in de-
termining how raising the ERA will affect the public ﬁnances by gener-
ating additional tax revenues. However, the larger publicﬁnance picture
and individuals' welfare will also be affected if individuals work full-
time rather than part-time or if increasing the ERA increases thenumber
of individuals claiming unemployment or disability beneﬁts. Therefore,
we have also examined how increasing the ERA affects the propensity to
work full- or part-time or to engage in other economic activities. Fig. 2
showed that, prior to the reform, at age 60 there was a drop in both
full- and part-time employment and the increase in self-deﬁned retire-
ment was larger than the fall in employment.
We ﬁrst use a multinomial probit model to estimate the impact of
being above the ERA on whether a woman is in full-time work, in
part-timework or not in paid employment. These results are presented
in the top panel of Table 5. While both full-time and part-time employ-
ment is found to have increased as a result of increasing the ERA, the im-
pact on full-time employment is slightly larger (at 3.5 percentage
points) than the impact on part-time employment (2.9 percentage
points).
Table 5
Effect of increasing the early retirement age from 60 to 62 onwomen's economic activity.
Effect of
being
under ERA
Standard
error
Average prevalence at ages 60
&
61 pre-reform
Hours of work
Full-time work 0.035*** [0.013] 17.7%
Part-time work 0.029** [0.013] 23.2%
Out of work −0.064*** [0.014] 59.1%
Economic activity
In work 0.055*** [0.014] 40.9%
Unemployed 0.012*** [0.003] 0.8%
Inactive: Sick or
disabled
0.040*** [0.008] 9.0%
Inactive: “Retired” −0.115*** [0.012] 43.8%
Inactive: Other 0.008 [0.008] 5.5%
Notes:
* denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level. There are
60,173 observations in both models. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level
and estimated by bootstrapping with 1000 replications. Estimates were successfully pro-
duced on all replications for the multinomial probit with three outcomes and on 997 of
these replications for themultinomial probit with ﬁve outcomes. Pre-reform economic ac-
tivities estimated from LFS data in 2008–09 and 2009–10.
** Denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level.
*** Denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level.
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the impact of increasing the ERA on the prevalence of ﬁve different eco-
nomic activities. As the bottom panel of Table 5 shows, the estimated
impact on being ‘retired’ (−11.5 percentage points) is larger in absolute
terms than the impact on being in paid work (5.5 percentage points).
This model also suggests that there was a signiﬁcant increase in the
proportion of women reporting being unemployed when the ERA was
increased (1.2 percentage points). This is a large effect given that the
proportion of age 60 year old women who were unemployed prior to
the rise in the ERA was only 0.8% and will have reduced the net gain
to the public ﬁnances from increasing the ERA. The increase in preva-
lence of unemployment when the ERA is increased could arise because
individuals continue actively seeking paid work until they reach ERA,
when they qualify for non-employment income sources (such as state
pensions), which do not have the same job search requirements as
working-age out-of-work beneﬁts, such as unemployment beneﬁt
(known as Jobseeker's Allowance). However, it is very small compared
to the 12 percentage point increase in the proportion claiming unem-
ployment beneﬁt found to have been caused by the increase in the
ERA in Austria (Staubli and Zweimüller 2013).
Table 5 also shows that we estimate the increasing the ERA for
women increases the probability of 60 and 61 year old women saying
they are economically inactive due to being “sick and disabled” by 4.0
percentage points, compared to a pre-reform baseline of 9.0%. This in-
crease may be because women remain eligible for “Employment and
Support Allowance” (the UK's version of Disability Insurance – for
more details, see Banks et al. (2015)) until they reach the ERA. Alterna-
tively, it may be that reaching the ERA changes the reason that people
identify for not being in (or seeking) work: the social norm is only to
identify as “retired” once they have reached the ERA. These ﬁndings
are in contrast to the ﬁndings from Staubli and Zweimuller (2013),
who do not ﬁnd increases in DI when the ERA is increased, despite the
fact that rates of receiving DI around the ERA is much higher in Austria.5. Conclusion
Many countries have legislated to increase early or normal pension
claiming ages over the last few decades, partly but not exclusively mo-
tivated by a desire to reduce the future cost of publicly-funded pension
promises. A number of papers have conducted ex ante simulation ofsuch reforms using out-of-sample predictions, which suggested quite
large equilibrium effects in many countries (Fields and Mitchell, 1984;
Gustman and Steinmeier, 1985; Rust and Phelan, 1997; Coile and
Gruber, 2000; Blundell and Emmerson, 2007). Ex post evaluations of
changes to normal and early retirement ages have tended to ﬁnd, if any-
thing, larger effects than were suggested by the ex ante simulations.
Most ex post evaluations of such reforms have focused on changes to
normal (rather than early) retirement ages and have found sizeable ef-
fects (for example, Mastrobuoni, 2009; Behagel and Blau, 2012; Lalive
and Staubli, 2014). Three previous papers have examined the effect of
changing the ERA: Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999) and, more re-
cently, Staubli and Zweimüller (2013) and Atalay and Barrett (2015).
In this paper, we have used evidence from the UK to add to this small
existing literature, providing the ﬁrst evidence from a country where
there are only very limited ﬁnancial incentives to exit work at the ERA.
In 1995, the UK government legislated to increase the earliest age at
which women could claim a state pension from 60 to 65 between April
2010 and March 2020. This paper is the ﬁrst to examine (ex post) the
impact of this policy on women's economic activity at older ages,
using data covering the period up to June 2014. Our results, which
allow for a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of cohort effects, suggest that employ-
ment rates did increase signiﬁcantly as a result of the change in ERA –
by 6.3 percentage points using our preferred speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd sta-
tistically signiﬁcant rises in both full-time andpart-time female employ-
ment as a result of the reform.
In addition to the impact on employment rates, we ﬁnd the policy
has also led to a 1.2 percentage point increase in the fraction of
women who are unemployed and actively seeking work at ages 60
and 61. We also ﬁnd a 4.0 percentage point increase in the proportion
of women reporting themselves to be economically inactive due to sick-
ness or disability. These increases in employment, unemployment, and
economic inactivity due to sickness/disability are offset by a large reduc-
tion in the proportion self-reporting themselves to be retired.
Subgroup analysis provides some evidence on which mechanisms
may be important in explaining the changes in behavior that we ob-
serve. There is no signiﬁcant difference in the response among owner-
occupiers and renters, which we interpret as suggestive evidence that
credit constraints may not be the primary driver. In addition, the cohort
ﬁxed effects included in our model control for differences in state pen-
sion wealth across cohorts that are a direct result of the increase in
the ERA. Moreover, omitting cohort controls, or including (some) inter-
actions between cohort and age do not materially change our results.
Therefore, we can also rule out that these are the major driving force
of the response we see. This is not surprising given a one-year loss of a
state pension is equivalent to only 0.8% of median family wealth for
these women. Finally, in contrast to increases in the ERA that have
been legislated in other countries (notably Austria and Australia), the
absence of any earnings test in the UK, means that there are not strong
ﬁnancial incentives to retire at the ERA.
Overall, we ﬁnd a large impact of the increase in the ERA on female
labor market behavior in the UK. Together with the evidence on the
lack of importance of credit constrains, marginal ﬁnancial incentives,
and wealth effects in explaining the response we see, this suggests
that the role of the ERA in providing a signal about the appropriate re-
tirement age may be an important reason why increasing the ERA
feeds through into such a sizeable effect on labor force participation.
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Table A.2
Effect of the early retirement age on female employment: OLS regression results.
Effect on female
employment
Standard
error
Under ERA 0.063*** [0.015]
Cohabiting 0.055*** [0.020]
Single −0.020 [0.025]
Widowed −0.021 [0.023]
Divorced/Separated 0.058*** [0.020]
Other HE −0.063*** [0.015]
A level or equivalent −0.021 [0.015]
O level or equivalent −0.050*** [0.014]
Other −0.078*** [0.015]
No qualiﬁcations −0.215*** [0.014]
Not white −0.062*** [0.020]
Rents house −0.161*** [0.011]
Partner's age (years and quarters) −0.026** [0.011]
Partner's age squared 0.000** [0.000]
Partner's age: 60–64 −0.032** [0.015]
Partner's age: 65–69 −0.090*** [0.023]
Partner's age: 70+ −0.079* [0.043]
Partner's education: other HE 0.036* [0.019]
Partner's education: A level 0.064*** [0.015]
Partner's education: O level 0.064*** [0.018]
Partner's education: other 0.096*** [0.018]
Partner's education: no qualiﬁcations 0.061*** [0.017]
Notes:
Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at the individual level. This regression
model uses women born in 1949–50 to 1953–54 from 2009Q2 to 2014Q2. Nineteen geo-
graphical area dummy variables, twenty year and quarter dummy variables, twenty-nine
dummies for age in years and quarters, three dummies for ﬁnancial year of birth, and a
constant also included in the model. Effects estimated relative to baseline of cohort
1949–50, age 60Q1, married, white, owns house, with a degree, and with a partner with
a degree. Number of observations: 60,173.
* Denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10% level.
** Denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level,
*** Denotes that the effect is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 1% level,
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Appendix A
See Table A1.
See Table A2.Table A.1
Number of women observed above and below the early retirement age (aged 59–62).
Birth
cohort
Age in years and quarters
59
Q1
59
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
59 59 60 60 60 60 61 61 61 61 62 62 62 62
Q4
1949Q2 73 165 159 158 155 168 166 164 137 159 163 163 146
1949Q3 73 154 149 140 135 155 137 129 126 148 147 157 153 154
1949Q4 76 153 157 172 157 162 150 144 141 134 161 133 144 137 139
1950Q1 92 171 186 174 159 169 154 151 129 138 129 147 133 147 140 146
1950Q2 181 179 175 178 171 169 158 155 146 163 151 136 147 148 126 149
1950Q3 170 159 148 142 121 128 119 138 147 163 146 150 155 145 149 153
1950Q4 149 137 134 120 120 115 131 140 157 135 133 129 134 134 141 134
1951Q1 139 138 121 123 124 126 150 152 153 156 156 139 155 141 135 139
1951Q2 177 157 155 132 133 138 149 148 143 142 140 134 142 138 132 144
1951Q3 122 125 110 112 128 144 141 132 148 153 154 136 131 140 140 59
1951Q4 117 125 130 134 137 128 126 109 119 131 139 126 129 120 56
1952Q1 129 122 142 150 145 161 145 157 136 126 123 135 138 70
1952Q2 137 143 171 142 156 175 155 174 159 165 144 142 83
1952Q3 137 142 126 114 123 123 117 112 118 120 120 67
1952Q4 132 134 137 133 119 124 130 121 136 146 64
1953Q1 132 153 132 141 154 134 118 133 131 56
1953Q2 150 149 147 161 167 163 159 166 83
1953Q3 121 118 124 125 134 139 152 79
1953Q4 124 131 135 107 139 135 72
1954Q1 132 126 123 143 151 68
Notes: Dark shaded cells indicate women who are all over their ERA. Light shaded cells indicate combinations of age and cohort where some women are
above and some women are below the ERA. Number of women refers to number of observations in the LFS without data problems, and which are therefore
used in estimation of impact of being under the ERA.
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